Market-based Financing Reforms and Shareholder Valuations: Event Study Evidence from the Chinese Science and Technology Innovation Board by Qin, Yaohua et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Market-based Financing Reforms and
Shareholder Valuations: Event Study
Evidence from the Chinese Science and
Technology Innovation Board
Yaohua Qin and He Xiao and Yifei Zhang
Beijing Normal University-Hong Kong Baptist University United
International College, Beijing Normal University-Hong Kong Baptist
University United International College, Beijing Normal
University-Hong Kong Baptist University United International
College
19 May 2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/95399/
MPRA Paper No. 95399, posted 3 August 2019 10:35 UTC
1 
 
Market-based Financing Reforms and Shareholder Valuations: Event Study 
Evidence from the Chinese Sci-Technology Innovation Board 
Yaohua Qin, He Xiao, Yifei Zhang 
Beijing Normal University-Hong Kong Baptist University United International College 
July 31, 2019 
Abstract 
This paper studies the impact of the newly introduced sci-technology innovation board 
(STAR) on stock valuations in China. This Nasdaq-style board features a market-based 
IPO system that contrasts with the current approved-based arrangement. Event study 
approach shows that A-share firms pertaining to STAR related industries increased 
significantly after the reform announcement. The effect is stronger for Non-SOEs and 
firms with higher R&D capacity. By taking the announcement of STAR market as an 
exogenous shock, we employ a difference-in-differences (DD) identification strategy 
to explore the channel of the increased CAR from the reduced information asymmetry. 
The quasi-natural experiment results show that the financial analyst, research report, 
and broker company coverage on the STAR related firms surged significantly while 
KV index decreased. A further triple difference (DDD) is applied to estimate the 
heterogenous effects for firm-level characteristics. The results echo to our regression 
findings and show that the information asymmetry of the non-SOEs and firms with 
stronger R&D capacity lessened even sharper. Public shareholders of the firms filing 
the STAR IPO applications experienced salient growth in their abnormal returns while 
their industry competitors suffered price drops.  
Keywords: China's financial reform, Registration-based IPO system, Sci- technology 
innovation board in China, Chinese financial markets.*  
JEL Classification Codes: G18, G38, N25, O16.
 
* The authors thank Xin Chen, Wenrui Liang, and Weijing Lin for their excellent research supports and 
delicate data collection efforts. 
1 
 
“The detailed rules for a Nasdaq-style start-up board in Shanghai have fueled hopes 
among early-stage companies the new regime could bring about positive changes in 
China’s stance towards raising equity that investors have been seeking…… If 
successful, the board could also position Shanghai as a capital-raising competitor to 
Hong Kong and New York, who between them accounted for 68.7 percent of the 
money raised through Chinese IPOs last year……” 
                   Reuters (February 11, 2019) 
1. Introduction 
China's economic reform over the last four decades has unleashed an unprecedented 
economic development. Meanwhile, its financial system demands a corresponding 
progress to support and promote the economic rise (Levine, 1999; Rousseau & Wachtel 
2000; Beck & Levine, 2004). The Chinese stock market, whose total market 
capitalization ranked the second and the third in the world at the end of year 2017 and 
2018 respectively, has witnessed a long-lasting prosperity ever since its establishment 
in 1991 (Franklin et al., 2018). Yet, the relatively lag of financial market accessibility 
contrasts with the rapid growth of its depth, as evidenced by the indices of financial 
market depth (FMD) and access (FMA) of China in Figure 1. Since the ability of firms 
to access financial market is pivotal in measuring one country’s financial system 
development and the prosperity of the economy (Levine, 2005; Svirydzenka, 2016), 
further reforms become urgent for both the short-run and long-run growth of Chinese 
economy. Chinese financial market accessibility, mainly featured by the initial public 
offering (IPO) system, however, is being widely challenged by its inefficient selection 
rules and process (Johanssona et al., 2017).  
Under current practices, IPO applications need to respond to restricted and selected 
IPO qualifications, including profitability, cash flow, and asset quality, before formally 
approved by the Public Offering Review Committee of the Chinese Security Regulatory 
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Commission (CSRC) (Chen & David, 2013; Song, Tan, & Yang, 2014)1. Inefficient 
allocation during the IPO process is also detected and political connections are found 
to have a strong association with the approval and processing speed of initial public 
offering (IPO) activities in China (Li & Zhou, 2015;  Hafiz & Shaolong, 2019). Joseph 
et al. (2014) show that larger state-owned firms tend to have superior government 
connections and they are more likely to take advantages in IPO process. Thus, China’s 
current IPO system calls for a transition from the approval-based arrangement toward 
a market-based mechanism (Cheng, Ouyang, & Tan, 2009; Cohn & Yinzhi, 2018).  
Echoing such increasing demand, president Xi Jinping officially announced, on 
November 5, 2018, the establishment of the sci-technology innovation board (STAR) 
that pilots the registration-based system during the First China International Import 
Expo. China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) later officially issued the IPO 
guidelines for STAR in the evening of January 30, 2019 after the formal endorsement 
by the Central Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Commission, the highest Chinese 
national policy maker. Besides the U.S. style registration system, the purpose of STAR, 
as claimed by the regulatory body, is to host companies in technology and emerging 
industries. Firms with growth potentials but experienced temporary financial losses are 
also eligible to be listed in the new board. CSRC is responsible for overseeing the filing 
firms and promoting full public disclosure and it will focus on the accuracy of 
information disclosure rather than firms’ past performances. It is widely believed to be 
one of the most important financial reforms in Chinese market and the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Composite rise about 5.23% and 9.90% in wake of CSRC announcement 
within the five trading days respectively. 
 
1 According to CSRC current requirements, IPO companies should maintain their profits at an 
aggregate amount of more than RMB 30 million for the last three years; and their cumulative cash 
flows from operating activities for the last three years must exceed RMB 50 million or their cumulative 
operating income for the last three years must exceed RMB 300 million. For the requirements of asset 
quality, IPO company intangible assets (excluding land use rights, marine cultivation rights, and 
mining rights) can not surpass 20% of the net assets at the end of the latest year. 
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In this paper, we shed light on shareholder valuations of this financial reform by 
analyzing the stock market reactions. According to the efficient-market hypothesis 
(EMH), stock markets respond instantly to policy shocks, as investors revise their 
beliefs momentarily. Thus, the prospects of the financial reform viewed by rational 
shareholders are indicated by the changes in stock valuations. The channels through 
which financial reform affects the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) are 
also examined by exploring the reduction of the information asymmetry through market 
attention and information quality. We also study the significant market performance 
from incorporating the potential heterogeneous impacts of the reform on different firms 
pertaining to various firm characteristics.   
Our work finds that the CAAR of the STAR related industries increased significantly 
by 0.318% and 0.605% in one-day and three-day window respectively after the official 
IPO guidelines announcement, which shows an optimism for high-tech industry. In 
order to eliminate the effect from market speculations, we examine the long-term 
market responses through buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR) following classical 
long-term event studies (Loughran, 1995; Fama, 1998). The results show that BHAR 
roars 6.72% over 90 days, indicating that investors have a long run positive expectation 
over the value of the high-tech related industry firms. Firm-level regression models 
further detect heterogeneous impacts of firms’ characteristics on the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR). Non state-owned enterprises (Non-SOEs) and firms with 
higher R&D capacity also reacted positively in response to the reform announcement.  
In order to identify channel of the positive market reaction, we employ a difference-
in-differences (DD) estimation to examine the variation of information asymmetry after 
the announcement of STAR market, since a higher information disclosure standard is 
emphasized by STAR market regulations. Following the spirits from Frankel and Li 
(2004), Armstrong et al (2011), and Ascioglu et al (2005), we use financial analyst, 
research report, broker company coverage, and KV index as proxies to measure firm 
information asymmetry. The DD results demonstrate that the analyst, research report, 
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and broker company coverage on the STAR related firms grew significantly while KV 
index dropped compared with their counterparts in the main board. The channel of 
heterogeneous effect for firm-level characteristics are examined through a DDD 
framework, which shows that the information asymmetry of non-SOEs and firms with 
stronger R&D capacity decreased faster compared with their counterparts in STAR 
related industries. Both outcomes indicate that the channel of the market reaction went 
through the variation of the information asymmetry for the STAR related firms after 
the STAR announcement. 
Loosening the selection process is considered to be the most distinguished feature of 
the STAR, which creates more potential financing opportunities and hence improves 
firms’ market value. We then directly investigate the investors’ valuations of potential 
relaxations of firms’ market financing accessibilities by focusing on the sample firms 
which have ownerships of the firms filing IPO applications. Many high-tech firms 
rushed into filing applications to STAR after CSRC’s announcement.2 Using hand-
collected data from their official prospects, ownership involvements by the A-share 
firms are detected. By adopting the event study approach again on individual filing date 
announced by the Shanghai Stock Exchange, we find significantly positive market 
responses in one-day and three-day event windows. Our result is also supported by 
empirical works that a positive valuation effect of parent firms exists when announcing 
carve-out decisions (Schipper & Smith 1986; Slovin et al., 1995; Allen, 1998; Hulbert 
et al., 2002). By employing firm characteristics, we demonstrate that the one-day and 
three-day CAR of Non-SOE companies were better than their SOE peers while listed 
companies with higher R&D expenditures growth rate in the past benefited more from 
the event.  
Increasing competitions due to the financial reform could be the only “downside”, 
which harms the incumbents that directly compete with the firms that are eligible to be 
 
2 As of May 19, 2019, there are 109 companies submitting their application in STAR according to the 
WIND database. 
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listed in the STAR. Existing literature finds that publicly traded industry competitors in 
the market experience negative stock returns in responses to their industry rivals’ 
successful IPOs and positive stock price responses to their IPO withdrawal (Akhigbe, 
Johnston, & Madura, 2006; Hsu, Reed, & Rocholl 2010). Hulburt, Miles, and 
Woolridge (2002) echoes the evidences from competitors of carve-out parent firms by 
showing the negative announcement-period returns after the announcements of equity 
carve-outs. Our results, consistent with previous studies, display a significantly 
negative stock return of the competitors listed in the main board after the announcement 
of IPO applications to STAR and the negative CAR was stronger for applicants issuing 
relative larger shares. 
Our study relates to the existing literature in several folds. First of all, we are among 
the first studies targeting on the influences of registration-based system reform in 
financial market from emerging countries, while existing literatures mainly focused on 
financial regulatory policy changes and how it could promote market efficiency 
(Angelini & Cetorelli, 2003; Kroszner & Strahan, 2011; De Frutos & Manzano, 2014). 
Our research develops current financial regulatory policy literatures by targeting on 
financial reform that systematically change from approved-based to registration-based 
system. We also deepen out study through how emerging financial markets would react 
to this significant financial shock, as well as how firm characteristics could affect the 
extent of this market reaction. Second, our paper explores the literatures regarding the 
role played by information asymmetry on firm market performance. We examine the 
channel of positive market reaction through the effect of information asymmetry with 
the proxies of financial analyst, research report, broker coverage, and KV index. The 
finding confirms the significant impact of information asymmetry on the variation of 
the related market performance. Third, our study extends IPO literatures by considering 
the impact of announcement of potential IPO participants on financial market and how 
this financial reform could improve IPO efficiency while most of studies concentrated 
on IPO company characteristics, firm performance, as well as inefficient IPO policies 
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(Ritter & Welch, 2002; Joseph et al., 2007; Tian, 2011; Song, Tan, & Yang, 2014). 
Fourth, our study supplements the existing research which mainly concerns how 
government subsidy program support high-tech company (Wallsten, 2000; Howell, 
2017) since high-tech firms in many countries are struggling with financial constrains 
for R&D and innovation (Hall, 2002; Himmelberg & Petersen, 1994; Bond, Harhoff, 
& Reenen, 2003). We, on the other hand, focus on how financial market was functioned 
by the government to financially support high tech companies.  
2. Background and Significance of the Events 
In order to improve its overall efficiency and allocation of capital of the market, the 
Chinese financial reform has been launched since the initiation of the security market 
in 1990. Tradition reforms for Chinese financial regulatory framework normally 
initiated from over-restrictive to over-unrestrictive, and then revised by supplementary 
regulations (Cheung, Ouyang, & Tan, 2009)3. The significant reforms in Chinese stock 
market history, as shown in Table 1, have made great contributions to the Chinese stock 
market. For example, the split-share reform in 2006 converted a large number of non-
tradable shares to tradable shares in the market thus stimulating stock markets and 
promoting SOE firm performance (Li et al, 2011; Kai et al, 2011; Liao et al, 2014; ). 
In spite of decades of financial reforms in China that have led the regulations more 
market-based, the selection procedure for IPOs is still more inclined to merits, which 
follows case-by-case evaluation systems being strictly supervised by the government 
(Johanssona et al., 2017; Li & Zhou, 2015). A further and deeper financial reform was 
considered to be necessary during the recent decades to further reduce financial 
frictions and constrains, to make a more financial liberalized and marketized Chinese 
security market, and to financially support national economy to grow healthily and 
 
3 The over-restrictive regulations could generally screen ill-performed firms and thus protect investors. 
On the other hand, they also create high barriers preventing many small but promising companies from 
going public. At the same time, over-unrestrictive regulations, which allow more companies to enter 
into the capital markets, might also carry underqualified firms for investors (Cheung, Ouyang, & Tan, 
2009). 
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solidly (Farrell, Lund, & Morin, 2006; Chan, Dang, & Yan, 2012; Sandra, Walter, & 
Vandenbussche, 2010). Moreover, the financial reforms are expected to channel more 
funds to private companies and small, medium companies, and high-tech initiatives, all 
of which has been regarded as the engine of growth in China's economy (Chen, Ke, Wu, 
& Yang, 2016). Such reforms with more financial opportunities would also be 
anticipated to provide Chinese savers substantially higher returns and thus elevate 
living standards and possibly consumption throughout the country (Chen & David, 
2013).  
These urgent requests stimulated a major financial reform of the Chinese capital 
market Back to December, 2015, the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress announced the authorization of the stock pilot registration system. The 
progress, however, grinded to a standstill in 2017. November 5, 2018, president Xi 
Jinping, officially announced the establishment of STAR and pilot registration system 
and depicted the promising development of this new-established financial market. And 
on January 30, 2019, the CSRC issued the guidelines of implementation of STAR and 
the pilot registration-based system in Shanghai Stock Exchange. According to the 
guidelines, STAR has no rigid requirements for the profits and capital structures of the 
IPO applicants, which fundamentally supports various technological innovations in the 
country4. STAR mainly targets on small and medium-sized technology start-ups and 
strategic emerging sectors with great growth potentials.  
On March 1, 2019, the details of pilot registration-based System were released to 
further emphasize market information transparency and the roles of the CSRC, 
including the oversight on listed firms and possible illegal activities in the new board 
 
4 The China Securities Regulatory Commission “CSRC”, (Jan 30, 2019). “Opinions on the 
Implementation of Establishing the Sci-Technology Board and Pilot Registration System in Shanghai 
Stock Exchange”. Retrieved from  
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/zjh/201901/P020190130725847011706.pdf 
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such as fraudulent IPO and false financial statement5. This registration-based system 
follows the US IPO mechanism that provides more flexibilities for stock issuance, 
trading, and delisting, while releasing certain capital constraints of IPO companies 
(Barth & Jahera, 2010; Wright, 2002).6  
 
3. Data, Sample, and Methodology 
3.1 Event Study Methodology  
Event study methodology is pervasive in assessing shareholders’ valuation of some 
exogenous shocks based on efficient market hypothesis. Chinese market is functioning 
relatively efficiently since the prices of Chinese securities are strongly connected with 
listed firm fundamentals and the fluctuation of stock prices are as informative about 
future earnings as they are in the American market (Carpenter et al., 2018). Thus, Lin 
et al. (2018) analyzes the stock market response of China’s anti-corruption movement 
while Fisman et al.  (2014) estimates the abnormal return after the interstate frictions 
between China and Japan. Stock market reaction can also be gauged the potential 
impact of financial reforms. Hackbarth et al. (2015) adopts this method to assess the 
financial reforms relating the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act and the subprime crisis 
respectively. Following MacKinlay (1997), we utilize the single factor market model 
in the main analysis. The results are consistent if employing the Fama-French three-
 
5 The China Securities Regulatory Commission “CSRC”, (Mar 1, 2019). “Measures for the 
Administration of the Registration of IPO Stocks on the Sci-Technology Innovation Board (for Trial 
Implementation)”. Retrieved from 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/zjh/201903/t20190301_351633.htmlThe China Securities 
Regulatory Commission “CSRC”, (Mar 1, 2019). “Measures for the Continuous Supervision of 
Companies Listed on the Sci-Technology Innovation Board (for Trial Implementation)”. Retrieved 
from http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/zjh/201903/t20190302_351634.htm 
6 The financial accessibilities of high-tech enterprises grow with stronger market inclusiveness, and 
more diversified market functions (Brown, Fazzari, & Petersen, 2009; Padilla-Ospina et al., 2018). 
Information asymmetry in IPO is anticipated to be lessened by the involvement of the market investors 
and the influences of IPO companies and its CEO competencies (Gounopoulos et al., 2018). 
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factor model (1993), following the spirit of Fisman et al., (2014) and Wang and Xu 
(2005). 
In our event study, we use January 31 as T0 since the announcement of the financial 
reform is in the evening of January 30. We did not select the event date of November 5 
since the market has not clearly detected any details of the implementation of the STAR 
program on that early date. While the event date of March 1 could not catch all the 
effects since the market expectation has already been perceived after the event of 
January 31. The [-10, +10] days are selected as the event window to do our test. We 
also estimate the event window for [-7, +7], [-5, +5], [-3, +3], [-1, +1], [-1, +1], [0, +1], 
[0, +3], [0, +5], [0, +7], [0, +10]. The estimation window is set to be [-180, -30] days. 
3.2 Sample and Summary Statistics 
The initial sample starts with public A share firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange. Financial, “special treatment” (“ST”), and National Equities 
Exchange and Quotations (NEEQ-listed) companies are excluded. All stock returns, 
ownerships, analyst forecasts, and the relevant financial data are extracted from the 
CSMAR and Resset database. The summary of the key variables of the study are shown 
in Table 2. 
3.2.1 Measures on Firm Characteristics 
Industries Related to STAR 
To investigate the possible impacts of the reform on listed firms, various proxies on 
firms’ characteristics are examined through the event studies. First, we identify the 
listed firms who are classified to the same industries that are highly welcome to be 
listed in the STAR. According to the announcement issued by CSRC, the related high-
tech industries were selected based on OECD industry classification, following the 
study from Galindo-Rueda and Verger (2016). These companies and their 
corresponding CSRC industry codes (2012) are presented in Table 3. 
SOE and Non-SOE Firms 
10 
 
As non-state-owned firms (Non-SOEs) have relative disadvantages in accessing 
credit markets (Song et al., 2011), the financial reform that provides better environment 
for fund raising could relieve the credit constraint of Non-SOE firms more that of the 
state-own enterprises (SOEs). Therefore, we distinguish the SOE and Non-SOE firms 
by the code of equity nature provided by the CSMAR.  
R&D  
Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique (2004) identified that firms' shareholders would 
expect significantly positive abnormal return after the increase of R&D expenditures of 
their companies, while R&D intensity has also been considered as a major effect of firm 
performance (Lin, Lee, & Hung, 2006). Hence, we also study the influences of R&D 
growth rate and intensity (measured by R&D/Sales) towards CAR of the events. 
Related Firms 
Empirical work supports a positive valuation effect of parent firms when announcing 
carve-out decisions (Schipper & Smith, 1986; Slovin et al., 1995; Allen, 1998; Hulbert 
et al., 2002). To carry out the study of the abnormal returns of the listed firms that are 
shareholders of the potential IPO firms, we select related firms that are recorded by the 
WIND database. Besides, all financial data of the potential IPO firms are from the 
WIND database as well. The number of related firms is 53 (as of May 19, 2019) and 
their names and stock code are listed in Appendix I.  
Competitor  
As shown by Hsu et al., (2011) and Lee et al., (2011), the incumbents that directly 
compete with the potential IPO firms might be adversely affected. To quantify such 
impact, we manually collected the competitor information from the IPO prospects. 
Appendix II shows the IPO companies as well as their listed business competitors. 
Analysts 
A typical concern of the event study approach employed above is that investors’ over 
and under-reaction could be overlooked (De Bondt & Thaler, 1985; Hirshleifer & 
Subrahmanyam, 1998), even after the adjustment of size and beta (Chopra et al., 1992). 
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These biases are also detected during the announcement of public policies (Bernanke 
& Kuttner, 2005). In emerging markets, Bailey et al. (2003) and Boubaker et al. (2015) 
find heterogeneous responses between analysts and stock market following a financial 
regulatory reform. Therefore, we take analyst into consideration in our research. As 
presented by Derrien and Kecskés (2013), analyst coverage on listed firms declines as 
a result of the real effects of financial shocks and the decline of analyst coverage would 
later aggregate information asymmetry and thus rises the cost of capital. Conrad et al., 
(2006) mentioned analysts are inclined to update their recommendation as large stock 
price increases or major news announced.  Our research followed those research tracks 
and looked at the changes of analyst attention for the event, including analyst coverage 
and research report coverage. Analyst coverage is the number of analysts actively 
tracking and publishing opinions on firms within one month. Report coverage is the 
number of reports tracking and analyzing firms within one month. Broker coverage is 
the number of investment banks or security companies which track and analyze firms 
within one month.  
4. Empirical Framework and Results 
4.1 The Market Reaction to the Policy Announcement  
The event study methodology employed shows consistently and significantly 
positive stock market reactions for firms belonging to the related industries. Table 4 
shows that CAAR for three-day [0,3], five-day [0,5], and seven-day [0,7] is all 
significantly positive. Figure 2 demonstrates the trends of the CAAR through window 
[-10, 10] is moving upward around T0. The results show that investors consider the 
event as an important and good news to the market. Event study using three-factor also 
matches this positive market reaction. 
The short term significantly positive result may come from market speculations. 
Therefore, we extend the post event window to a longer period [0, 90] and adopt buy 
and hold abnormal return (BHAR) following classical long-term event studies 
(Loughran, 1995; Fama, 1998). As the result shown in Table 5, long-term market 
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reaction BHAR roars 6.72% over 90 days. Figure 3 further shows that BHAR exhibits 
an obvious upward trend over 90 days post event window, indicating that investor’s 
positive expectation about the value of the high-tech related industry firms persist for a 
long run. 
4.2 The Channel of the Positive Market Reaction 
We try to exploit the possible channel of the positive market performance of the 
related industry firms in the main board. Since one distinguishable characteristic of the 
STAR market is that STAR has a strict requirement on information disclosure for its 
listed companies, main board firms which are in the STAR related industry would have 
a relatively higher information disclosure quality since the industry standard has been 
elevated. As a result, the positive return for the STAR related firm performance could 
be attributed to the expectation of lessening of the information asymmetry and 
increasing of the information disclosure quality of those industries because the degree 
of information asymmetry is strongly correlated with the cost of the capital of the firms 
and thus affect their market performance (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Armstrong et 
al, 2011; Lambert et al, 2011).  
Information asymmetry could be affected through various ways.  From the market 
perspectives, information asymmetry could be lessened by more research and wider 
coverage. Frankel and Li (2004) found that large analyst following and report coverage 
are able to reduce information asymmetry of the covered firms.  
Following the methodologies adopted by Frankel and Li (2004) and Armstrong et al 
(2011), our research uses financial analyst coverage as a proxy of information 
asymmetry to explore the channel of related companies’ positive CAR. We adopt a 
quasi-natural experiment methodology and treat the announcement of STAR market as 
an exogenous shock to the main board due to policy information asymmetry between 
the government and investors.  The following DD estimation was conducted to assess 
the impact of the announcement STAR on analysist coverage of the STAR related 
companies compared with the other list companies,  
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(1) !"#$%&' = )*	,%-./ ∗ 123#.' +	)5,%-./ + )6123#.' + #' +	7' 
(2) 83-$%&' = )*	,%-./ ∗ 123#.' +	)5,%-./ + )6123#.' + #' +	7' 
(3) 93$$%&' = )*	,%-./ ∗ 123#.' +	)5,%-./ + )6123#.' + #' +	7' 
The dependent variable, !"#$%&', 83-$%&', and 93$$%&'denotes analysts coverage, 
research coverage, and broker company coverage, measuring for the numbers of the 
analyst, research, and security company monthly coverage of :;2<' . 123#.'  is a 
dummy variable that equals one if it is the STAR related company and zero otherwise. ,%-./ is a dummy variable that equals one in the period after the event date, Jan 31, 
2019, and zero otherwise. #' represents a full set of firm and month fixed effects, with 
standard errors clustered at the firm level to account for any correlations of the error 
terms within each firm. 
As the results shown in Table 6, after the shock, analyst coverage, research 
coverage, and broker coverage of STAR related firms increase significantly compared 
with its counterparts in the market, by 2.058, 0.34, and 0.248 per month, respectively.  
Besides the analysist coverage, we also consider another channel for the expected 
decreasing information asymmetry, which is the improvement of information 
disclosure quality actively done by the listed companies. From the listed companies’ 
perspectives, the established STAR requires high information disclosure standards, 
which further stimulates the STAR related firms in main board paid an increasing 
attention on their voluntary information disclosure. More voluntary information 
disclosure could lessen market information asymmetry and thus reduce asymmetric 
information costs of trading and agency costs (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Ascioglu et al, 
2005). 
Following the practices of Ascioglu et al (2005), we adopt Kim and Verrecchia 
(KV) (Kim & Verrecchia, 2001) index as a proxy to measure information disclosure 
practices.  KV represents the slope coefficient of the regression of log absolute returns 
on abnormal volume, as shown in the following ordinary least squares regression. As 
the study of Ascioglu et al (2005), the KV measurement of firm disclosure is 
computed as 10,000 times the slope coefficient. 
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(4) ="|Δ@//@/B*| = C + 	)(E%F/ − E%FH) 	+	7'								 
where @/is the closing price on day t, E%F/is the daily trading volume in shares on day 
t, and E%FH is the mean of expected trading volume in shares for one-month sample 
period. Firms with a negative β and  Δ@/ = 0	are excluded from our research. 
Since volume declines when firms have shown better information disclosure quality, 
market savers rely less on volume for information and more on the disclosure, 
including audited financial statements (Ascioglu et al, 2005).  
 We further conduct a DD (difference-in-difference) model to identify the causal 
inference that the event made to the KV of the STAR related companies. 
(5) KE' = )*	,%-./ ∗ 123#.' +	)5,%-./ + )6123#.' + #' +	7' KE' refers to the information disclosure quality. ,%-./ is a dummy variable that 
equals one in the period after the event date, Jan 31, 2019, and zero otherwise. 123#.' 
is another dummy variable that equals one for the STAR related companies and zero 
otherwise. The coefﬁcient, )*, indicates the impact of the establishment of STAR on 
information disclosure quality KV index. A negative and signiﬁcant )* suggests that 
the establishment of STAR exerts a positive effect on the degree of information 
disclosure quality, while a positive and signiﬁcant )*indicates that the establishment 
of STAR pushed information disclosure quality in the other direction. We control the 
firm fixed effect and cluster the standard errors at the firm level. 
The DD results from Table 6 show that after the STAR announcement, KV index 
of STAR related firms decrease by 0.016 compared with other companies in the 
market. The outcome shows that the information disclosure quality of STAR related 
firms surges significantly since investors make transactions of these traded companies 
depending less on the information of their trading volumes after the shock.   
In sum, the positive CAR for the STAR related companies is achieved based on the 
effect their increasing information disclosure quality and decreasing information 
asymmetry to the market investors. This channel, on the one hand, could come from 
the greater attention from the market including wider coverage from analysts, analyst 
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research, and broker companies after the shock. On the other hand, it could come 
from STAR related companies’ active release of the information to follow the high 
standard of STAR market as a decreasing KV index indicates.  
4.3 Firm-level Regressions of CAR for the Policy Announcement Date 
Following Fisman et al., (2014), we incorporate the CAR generated from the event 
study to investigate the potential factors that affects the CAR. The regression model, 
which contains various firm characteristics, is stated as follows: 
(6) L!!8' = C +	)*	M;2<	$ℎ#2#$.32;-.;$-' +	)5	M;2<	$%".2%F' + O' +	7'								 
where  L!!8'  is the cumulative average abnormal return over the event window 
specified above. M;2<	$ℎ#2#$.32;-.;$-'  includes the possible factors such as state-
ownership dummy and R&D intensity and growth rate. Firm-level control variables are 
ROA, age, the logarithm of total assets, leverage ratio, and sales growth. We further 
control for industry fixed effects and the standard error is clustered at industry level. 
We first focus on firms pertaining to the industries that are highly likely to be listed in 
the STAR.  
Table 7 shows that non SOE companies have a significantly higher CAR for both 
one-day [0,1] and three-day [0,3] event window, compared to SOE companies. The 
result reflects that non SOE could expect more benefits based on the signals of this new 
event, compared to the traditional advantages of SOE. The R&D intensity is also 
significantly positively related to CAR for both one-day [0,1] and three-day [0,3] event 
window, while R&D growth rate is significantly positively related to CAR for one-day 
[0,1]. Also, the companies with higher R&D growth rate received more market 
investments after the events. The significant result of the interaction item, SOE* R&D 
growth rate, demonstrates that CAR of SOE company is less sensitive to its R&D 
growth rate. 
In addition to the subsample analysis, we analyze the conceivable causes that affect 
firms that not only belongs to the aforementioned industry, as the financial reform could 
potentially benefits all firms listed in the exchanges by sending a positive signal to the 
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whole market. Table 8 presents the significant results for the whole market, which echo 
to the outcomes from the related companies in the state-own natures, R&D growth rate, 
and interaction item SOE* R&D growth rate.  
4.4 The Channel of the Effect of Firm Characteristics 
In order to explore the heterogeneity of the firm characteristics on the variation of 
market responses, we further conduct a DDD (triple-difference) framework to test the 
possible channel of information disclosure quality as discussed above: 
(7) !"#$%&' = )*	,%-./ ∗ 123#.' ∗ M;2<	$ℎ#2#$.32;-.;$-; +	)5,%-./ + )6123#.' + #' +	7' 
(8) 83-$%&' = )*	,%-./ ∗ 123#.' ∗ M;2<	$ℎ#2#$.32;-.;$-; +	)5,%-./ + )6123#.' + #' +	7' 
(9) 93$$%&' = )*	,%-./ ∗ 123#.' ∗ M;2<	$ℎ#2#$.32;-.;$-; +	)5,%-./ + )6123#.' + #' +	7' where	!"#$%&' , 83-$%&' , and 93$$%&'means analyst coverage, research coverage, 
and broker company coverage. M;2<	$ℎ#2#$.32;-.;$-'  includes state-ownership 
dummy and R&D growth rate.  123#.', is a dummy variable that equals one if it is the 
STAR related company and zero otherwise. ,%-./ is a dummy variable that equals one 
in the period after the event date, Jan 31, 2019, and zero otherwise.	#' represents a full 
set of firm and month fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
As results presented in the Table 9, the significantly negative interaction item 
regarding SOE and analyst and broker coverage shows that the analyst and broker 
coverage is less than SOE STAR related firms compared with the non-SOEs. The 
significantly positive interaction item regarding R&D growth rate and analyst, report, 
and broker coverage demonstrates that there is a sharper increase of the analyst, report, 
and broker coverage for STAR related firms with higher R&D growth rate compared 
with the ones with lower R&D growth rate. Therefore, the channel of heterogenous 
effect is further confirmed that the information asymmetry for STAR related firms is 
reduced since there is a wider coverage from analyst, report, and brokers.  
4.5 The Related Parties’ Reaction on the Prospectus Releasing Dates  
We then investigate the investors’ valuations of potential relaxations of firms’ market 
financing accessibilities. To show the direct effects of relaxations of firms’ market 
financing accessibilities, we look at the CAAR of the listed firms that have ownerships 
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of firms filing IPO prospectus. According to the event study result, as shown in Table 
10 and Figure 4, the event window [-3,3], [-1,1], [0,1], and [0,3] all present significantly 
positive responses. That implies stronger financing accessibilities for these 
shareholders in the market and justifies the positive vision of future market as the 
previous study indicated. 
As for competitors of the listed firms (Competitor lists are shown in Appendix II) 
that have ownerships of firms filing IPO prospectus, they experienced a significantly 
negative CAR in all of event windows (seen in Table 11 and Figure 5). These represent 
that these competitors are facing a worse financial situation in the market. 
4.6 Firm-level Regressions of CAR for the Prospectus Releasing Dates 
To specify the heterogenous impacts, the following familiar regression framework is 
proposed: 
(10) L!8' = C +	)*	8&U	V2%W.ℎ' +	)5	;--X3	-ℎ#23-' +	)6	M;2<	$%".2%F' + O' +	7'							 
where i refers to those related firms which own shares of the STAR potential 
firms.	8&U	V2%W.ℎ' and ;--X3	-ℎ#23-' are the average R&D growth rate for the past 
three years and the listed companies’ share proportions of the STAR companies, 
respectively. Similar firm-control variables and industry fixed effects are specified. The 
standard error is clustered at industry level.  
The corresponding results are reported in Table 12 that both average R&D growth 
rate and the number of patents is positively correlated with the amount of CAR, which 
means the higher research expenditures and capacity, the higher market returns 
companies could generate. In this event, issue share percentages, on the other hand, 
present a negative correlation, which shows that higher issuing share percentages in 
STAR could dilute the ownership percentages of the shareholders. 
The regression results for the significant firm characteristics that impact competitors 
CAR are shown in Table 11. It shows that issue share percentages are significantly 
negatively correlated with CAR[-7,7], CAR[-5,5], and CAR[-3,3] of the competitors 
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which implies that higher capitals that IPO applicants could raise, the lower market 
performance the competitors encountered.  
 
5 Conclusion 
This article investigates the Chinese stock market reactions to the establishment of the 
STAR with the pilot registration-based system. We find significantly positive abnormal 
returns following the policy announcement for related high-tech industries. Further 
regression models show that CAR is higher for non-SOEs and firms with higher R&D 
capacity in both the whole market and related high industry industries. The implication 
of these findings is that non-SOEs and firms with stronger technology and innovation 
could receive more recognitions from the market since the event. To identify the 
channel of the positive market reaction, we examine the effect of the STAR policy 
announcement on the variation of information asymmetry of the STAR related firms. 
Applying analyst, research report, broker company coverage, and KV index as proxies 
to measure firm information asymmetry, we find that information asymmetry reduced 
significantly after the STAR policy announcement. The channel of heterogeneous 
effect for firm-level characteristics were investigated that the information asymmetry 
of non-SOEs and firms with stronger R&D capacity decreased faster compared with 
their counterparts in STAR related industries. Both outcomes indicate that the channel 
of the positive market reaction went through the variation of the information asymmetry 
for the STAR related firms after the STAR announcement.  
A variety of high-tech companies actively respond to the policy by submitting their 
applications. We then continue our investigations of the investors’ valuations of 
potential relaxations of firms’ market financing accessibilities by targeting on the 
sample firms with the shares of the firms filing IPO applications.  Regarding the 
prospectus releasing day, public shareholders of the firms filing STAR IPO applications 
experienced positive cumulative abnormal returns while their competitors suffered 
from negative ones. These abnormal returns are positively correlated with IPO 
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applicants’ R&D intensity and negatively related to the size of issue. This result shows 
that investors view the potential relaxations of firms’ market financing accessibilities 
as a significant signal for the related parties. 
As the research result shown, this significant financial reform stimulates the 
performance of the Chinese financial market and strengthen both investors’ and 
analysts’ confidences in the market and STAR related industries and companies. This 
will be a strong support for the Chinese financial system since the current approved-
based IPO system is inefficient and incompatible with the China’s gigantic stock market 
capitalization. The STAR is also aligned with national strategies in supporting high-
tech industries with strong technology and innovation capacity, promising 
developmental prospects, and decent market recognitions. It will be a key ingredient of 
the “Made in China 2025” strategic plan. Meanwhile, the reform also shows a move 
made by the Chinese government to counter U.S. economic sanctions and restrictions 
on China’s technology progression, including tightening rules around intellectual 
property theft and technology transfers. Thus, the development of STAR and future 
financial reforms is paramount importance for China’s future economic growth. Our 
research provides confident evidences of the positive feedback from the market. 
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Figure 1: Indices of financial market depth (FMD) and access (FMA) of China 
 
Source: IMF's Index of Financial Development prepared by Svirydzenka (2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
Financial Market Depth Financial Market Access
28 
 
Table 1  The significant reforms in Chinese stock market history  
1996 the launch of the restrictions of stock price 
2002 lessening stock brokerage feesthe introduction of QFII 
2004 the start of the small-and-medium sized enterprises board 
2005-2006 the split-share reformQDII  
2009 lessening the stamp dutythe growth enterprises market board 
2010 the initiation of margin trading and short sellingthe introduction of stock 
index futures, government bond futures, and the ETF50 options 
2011 RQFII 
2013 the New Third Market 
2014 the establishment of the Shanghai-Hong Kong Connect 
2016 the establishment of the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Connect 
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Table 2 Summary Statistic of main variables  
SOE is an indicator variable that equal to 1 if the firm is State-owned enterprise, otherwise it is 0. RD intensity is measured as R&D expenditure divided by sales.  RD 
Growth Rate is the average R&D expenditure growth rate. Sales Growth Rate is the average sales growth rate over most recently three years.  
 ALL firms Related High-tech Industry 
 
Total  SOE Non-SOE Total SOE Non-SOE 
Variable Mean Std. Mean  Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. 
RD Intensity 0.01 0.08 0 0.02 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 
RD Growth Rate 2.88 37.55 0.67 6.22 4.63 50.01 4.67 50.73 0.36 1.43 7.6 65.64 
Sales Growth Rate 26.49 126.27 16.12 108.22 34.18 137.67 24.01 86.38 12.53 25.92 30.08 104.66 
ROA 5.15 5.88 3.83 4.86 5.92 6.28 5.98 6.57 4.87 5.89 6.43 6.78 
Age 20.75 5.58 22.46 5.01 19.76 5.66 19.97 5.54 22.02 5.14 19.13 5.48 
Asset (billion yuan) 19.43 86.4 36.15 134.79 9.7 31.47 8.94 21.62 15.59 34.47 6.21 12.15 
Leverage 0.43 0.2 0.49 0.2 0.39 0.19 0.37 0.18 0.43 0.19 0.35 0.17 
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Table 3 Related High-tech industry distribution 
CSRC 
Industry 
Code 
 
Industry Name 
Number of 
Firms 
Percentage 
of Firms 
I64 Internet and related services 42 4.93 
C26 Manufacture of chemical raw materials and 
chemical products 
178 20.89 
C39 Manufacture of computers, communication 
and other electronic equipment 
224 26.29 
I65 Software and information technology services 74 8.69 
C37 Manufacture of railway, ships, aerospace and 
other transportation equipment 
39 4.58 
M73 Research and experimental development 4 0.47 
C27 Manufacture of medical products 164 19.25 
C35 Manufacture of special purpose machinery 127 14.91 
Total Number of Firms 852 100 
a The industry classification follows The Guidelines for the Industrial Classification of Listed 
Companies (Revised in 2012), issued by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CRSC) 
b According to the STAR announcement issued by CSRC, the related high-tech industries were 
selected based on OECD industry classification. 
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Table 4 Cumulative average abnormal return for related high-tech industry firms 
In this table, the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) of related high-tech industry firms 
around policy announcement date (31st January of 2019) are reported. Abnormal return is 
computed as the difference between the actual daily return and expected daily return over each 
indicated window. The expected return is estimated using market model by setting [-180, -30] 
trading days as the estimation window. Both T-statistic and Patell Z statistic and their 
corresponding P-value are reported.  
Days No. Firms CAAR T-Statistic P-value 
Patell 
Z-Statistic 
Patel 
P-value 
[-10,10] 812 0.46% 1.048 0.296 2.931 0.003 
[-7,7] 812 0.83% 2.473 0.015 5.705 0.000 
[-5,5] 811 0.63% 2.155 0.033 6.507 0.000 
[-3,3] 812 0.18% 0.758 0.449 1.485 0.138 
[-1,1] 812 0.22% 1.495 0.137 3.931 0.000 
[0,1] 812 0.32% 2.586 0.011 5.750 0.000 
[0,3] 812 0.60% 3.437 0.001 7.001 0.000 
[0,5] 812 0.93% 4.282 0.000 9.223 0.000 
[0,7] 812 1.20% 4.727 0.000 10.683 0.000 
[0,10] 812 0.78% 2.582 0.011 8.908 0.000 
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Figure 2 Cumulative average abnormal return for related high-tech industry firm 
with event window of [-10,10] 
The event date 0 is defined as the policy announcement date (31 January of 2019), Abnormal return 
is computed as the difference between the actual daily return and expected daily return over each 
indicated window. The expected return is estimated using market model by setting [-180, -30] 
trading days as the estimation window. 
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Table 5 Buy and Hold Abnormal Return for related high-tech industry firms over long run 
In this table, the buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR) of related high-tech industry firms around 
policy announcement date (31st January of 2019) for long period are reported. Abnormal return is 
computed as the difference between the actual daily return and expected daily return over each 
indicated window. The expected return is estimated using market model by setting [-180, -30] 
trading days as the estimation window. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
Event window No. of Firms BHAR Significance 
[0;5] 805 1.88% *** 
[0;10] 805 2.36% *** 
[0;20] 805 4.27% *** 
[0;30] 805 4.52% *** 
[0;40] 805 6.27% *** 
[0;50] 805 5.37% *** 
[0;60] 805 3.71% *** 
[0;70] 805 6.45% *** 
[0;80] 805 5.60% *** 
[0;90] 805 6.72% *** 
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Figure 3 Buy and Hold abnormal return for related high-tech industry firm within 90 
days 
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Table 6 The impact of opening STAR on information Asymmetry 
This table shows the impact of new policy announcement on information asymmetry for related industry firms. 
Information asymmetry is measured in following ways: (1) the number of report covering each firm every month 
(Report Coverage), (2) the number of analyst following each firm every month (Analyst Coverage), (3) the 
number of broker company following each firm every month, (4) KV, which is 1000000 times the slope 
coefficient of the regression of log absolute returns on abnormal volume over 5 months. The observations 
correspond to all listed nonfinancial A share firms. The period for each regression model covers from September 
of 2018 to June of 2019. Post is defined as 1 for February of 2019 and after, and 0 otherwise. Treat is defined as 
1 for related industry firms. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and appear in parentheses. ***, ** and 
* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Report Coverage Analyst Coverage Broker Coverage KV 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Post -4.082*** 
 
-0.809*** 
 
-0.530*** 
 
-0.101*** 
 
(-18.66) 
 
(-9.93) 
 
(-7.56) 
 
(-21.51) 
Post*treat 2.194*** 2.058*** 0.456*** 0.340** 0.394*** 0.284** -0.016* 
 
(6.82) (6.40) (3.12) (2.38) (3.02) (2.22) (-1.80) 
Constant 8.769*** 6.981*** 4.911*** 4.568*** 4.527*** 4.307*** 0.200*** 
 
(117.62) (162.33) (164.13) (239.26) (172.91) (251.14) (101.14) 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes NA 
Observations 9,785 9,785 9,785 9,785 9,785 9,785 5,132 
R-squared 0.526 0.652 0.588 0.689 0.591 0.689 0.806 
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Table 7 Regression of firm characteristics on cumulative abnormal return around policy announcement date for related high-tech firms 
This table presents the regression explains both 1-day [0,1] and 3-day [0,3] cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). Independent variables include the State-owned-
enterprise indicator (SOE), R&D expenditure to sales (RD Intensity) and R&D expenditure growth rate (RD Growth Rate). Control variables are Average sales 
growth rate over most recently three years (Sales Growth Rate), Return on Assets (ROA), firm age (Age), firm size (log(assets)) and debt to assets (Leverage). All 
models include industry fixed effect and standard errors are clustered at industry level. t-statistics associated with coefficients are reported in parentheses, ***, ** 
and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 CAR[0,1]  CAR[0,3] 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
SOE -0.463** 
  
-0.859 
 
-1.136*** 
  
-1.661** 
 
(-2.42) 
  
(-1.69) 
 
(-5.52) 
  
(-3.01) 
RD Intensity 
 
5.191** 
    
4.999** 
  
  
(3.10) 
    
(3.08) 
  
RD Growth Rate 
  
0.003*** 0.003** 
   
0.001 -0.000 
   
(5.14) (3.46) 
   
(0.74) (-0.38) 
SOE*RD Growth Rate 
   
0.372* 
    
0.250 
    
(2.12) 
    
(1.60) 
Sales Growth Rate -0.006** -0.006** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 
-0.005* -0.004 -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 
(-2.59) (-2.70) (-5.67) (-6.60) 
 
(-2.02) (-1.76) (-6.81) (-9.62) 
ROA 0.109*** 0.115*** 0.121*** 0.124*** 
 
0.083*** 0.088*** 0.092*** 0.094*** 
 
(6.73) (6.09) (3.83) (3.86) 
 
(7.05) (6.09) (3.55) (3.50) 
Age -0.029 -0.036 -0.000 0.012 
 
-0.001 -0.019 0.012 0.036 
 
(-1.27) (-1.56) (-0.00) (0.81) 
 
(-0.03) (-0.62) (0.33) (1.21) 
Size 0.577*** 0.533*** 0.116 0.156 
 
0.718*** 0.625*** 0.393 0.474 
 
(3.82) (3.52) (0.91) (1.11) 
 
(4.92) (4.43) (1.43) (1.56) 
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Leverage -0.065 -0.029 0.637 0.725 
 
0.634 0.532 -0.562 -0.394 
 
(-0.08) (-0.03) (0.41) (0.51) 
 
(0.49) (0.35) (-0.39) (-0.33) 
Constant -12.047*** -11.200** -2.508 -3.389 
 
-15.292*** -13.278*** -7.853 -9.596 
 
(-3.58) (-3.38) (-0.82) (-1.01) 
 
(-4.98) (-4.93) (-1.16) (-1.30) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 641 641 234 234 
 
641 641 234 234 
R-squared 0.128 0.129 0.126 0.146   0.174 0.164 0.224 0.255 
38 
 
Table 8 Regression of firm characteristics on cumulative abnormal return around policy announcement date for all firms 
This table presents the regression explains both 1-day [0,1] and 3-day [0,3] cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). Independent variables include the State-owned 
enterprise indicator (SOE), R&D expenditure to sales (RD Intensity) and R&D expenditure growth rate (RD Growth Rate). Control variables are Average sales 
growth rate over most recently three years (Sales Growth Rate), Return on Assets (ROA), firm age (Age), firm size (log(assets)) and debt to assets (Leverage). All 
models include industry fixed effect and standard errors are clustered at industry level. t-statistics associated with coefficients are reported in parentheses, ***, ** 
and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 CAR[0,1]  CAR[0,3] 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
SOE -0.087 
  
-0.649* 
 
-0.785*** 
  
-1.344*** 
 
(-0.49) 
  
(-1.82) 
 
(-4.22) 
  
(-3.45) 
RD Intensity 
 
-1.484* 
    
0.418 
  
  
(-1.96) 
    
(0.61) 
  
RD Growth Rate 
  
0.002* 0.003*** 
   
-0.001 -0.001 
   
(1.85) (3.59) 
   
(-0.66) (-0.76) 
SOE*RD Growth Rate 
   
-0.054*** 
    
-0.108*** 
    
(-3.38) 
    
(-7.59) 
Sales Growth Rate -0.002** -0.002** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 
-0.001* -0.001 -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 
(-2.49) (-2.47) (-4.53) (-5.19) 
 
(-1.73) (-1.37) (-3.76) (-4.93) 
ROA 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.124*** 0.121*** 
 
0.041** 0.046*** 0.093*** 0.088*** 
 
(3.85) (3.75) (3.71) (3.63) 
 
(2.65) (2.99) (4.27) (3.94) 
Age -0.010 -0.010 -0.049 -0.038 
 
0.004 -0.009 -0.026 -0.003 
 
(-0.71) (-0.73) (-1.67) (-1.31) 
 
(0.19) (-0.49) (-0.72) (-0.08) 
Size 0.442*** 0.438*** 0.156 0.211 
 
0.422*** 0.374*** 0.021 0.133 
 
(5.56) (5.67) (0.86) (1.26) 
 
(3.90) (3.60) (0.07) (0.46) 
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Leverage -1.383*** -1.442*** -0.276 -0.068 
 
-0.049 -0.183 -0.266 0.165 
 
(-2.75) (-2.91) (-0.17) (-0.05) 
 
(-0.08) (-0.28) (-0.20) (0.14) 
Constant -9.321*** -9.220*** -2.304 -3.563 
 
-9.237*** -8.189*** 0.944 -1.626 
 
(-5.40) (-5.47) (-0.60) (-1.01) 
 
(-3.68) (-3.44) (0.13) (-0.25) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,123 2,123 430 430 
 
2,124 2,124 430 430 
R-squared 0.098 0.099 0.192 0.202   0.129 0.122 0.274 0.302 
40 
 
Table 9 The heterogenous effect of opening STAR on information Asymmetry: firm characteristics 
This table shows the heterogenous impact of new policy announcement on information asymmetry for related industry firms. Information asymmetry is 
measured in following ways: (1) the number of report covering each firm every month (Report Coverage), (2) the number of analyst following each firm 
every month (Analyst Coverage), (3) the number of broker company following each firm every month, (4) KV, which is 1000000 times the slope 
coefficient of the regression of log absolute returns on abnormal volume over 5 months. The observations correspond to all listed nonfinancial A share 
firms. The period for each regression model covers from September of 2018 to June of 2019. Post is defined as 1 for February of 2019 and after, and 0 
otherwise. Treat is defined as 1 for related industry firms. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and appear in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
VARIABLES 
Analyst 
coverage 
Broker 
coverage 
Report 
coverage KV 
Analyst 
coverage 
Broker 
coverage 
Report 
coverage KV 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                
 
post×treat 0.604*** 0.511*** 2.271*** -0.013 -0.089 -0.167 1.589* -0.004 
 
(3.55) (3.30) (6.00) (-1.14) (-0.29) (-0.61) (1.95) (-0.20) 
post×SOE -0.098 -0.097 -0.888** 0.011 
    
 
(-0.60) (-0.69) (-1.97) (1.23) 
    
post×treat×SOE -0.904*** -0.773*** -1.011 -0.004 
    
 
(-2.93) (-2.81) (-1.45) (-0.27) 
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post×R&D Growth 
Rate 
    
-0.020*** -0.019*** -0.028** 0.002* 
     
(-2.86) (-3.40) (-2.17) (1.84) 
post×treat×R&D 
Growth Rate 
    
0.022*** 0.020*** 0.034*** -0.002* 
     
(3.15) (3.67) (2.62) (-1.76) 
Constant 4.603*** 4.339*** 7.191*** 0.200*** 5.030*** 4.704*** 7.403*** 0.105*** 
 
(127.18) (136.12) (78.30) (101.15) (68.69) (72.48) (38.50) (19.54) 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,662 9,662 9,662 5,132 1,905 1,905 1,905 888 
R-squared 0.691 0.690 0.655 0.806 0.699 0.697 0.661 0.742 
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Table 10 Cumulative average abnormal return for ownership related listed 
firms 
In this table, the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) of listed firms which are ownership 
related with STAR applicants announced prospectus releasing date are reported. Abnormal return is 
computed as the difference between the actual daily return and expected daily return over each 
indicated window. The expected return is estimated using market model by setting [-180, -60] 
trading days as the estimation window. Both T-statistic and Patell Z statistic and their corresponding 
P-value are reported. 
Days No. Firms CAAR T-Statistic P-value 
Patell 
Z-Statistic 
Patel 
P-value 
[-5,5] 51 1.84% 1.82 0.072 4.27 0.000 
[-3,3] 50 3.90% 4.89 0.000 7.24 0.000 
[-1,1] 51 4.72% 8.97 0.000 12.02 0.000 
[0,1] 51 4.88% 11.37 0.000 16.10 0.000 
[0,3] 51 3.34% 5.49 0.000 11.82 0.000 
[0,5] 51 1.40% 1.88 0.063 9.01 0.000 
[-5,5] 51 1.84% 1.82 0.072 4.27 0.000 
[-5,5] 51 1.84% 1.82 0.072 4.27 0.000 
[-5,5] 51 1.84% 1.82 0.072 4.27 0.000 
[-5,5] 51 1.84% 1.82 0.072 4.27 0.000 
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Figure 4 Cumulative average abnormal return for ownership related listed 
firm with event window of [-5,5]  
The event date 0 is defined as the prospectus releasing date, Abnormal return is computed as the 
difference between the actual daily return and expected daily return over each indicated window. 
The expected return is estimated using market model by setting [-180, -60] trading days as the 
estimation window 
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Table 11 Cumulative average abnormal return for competitors 
In this table, the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) of competitors to STAR applicants 
around prospectus releasing date are reported. Abnormal return is computed as the difference 
between the actual daily return and expected daily return over each indicated window. The expected 
return is estimated using market model by setting [-180, -60] trading days as the estimation window. 
Both T-statistic and Patell Z statistic and their corresponding P-value are reported. 
Days No. Firms CAAR T-Statistic P-value 
Patell 
Z-Statistic 
Patel 
P-value 
[-7,7] 75 -2.92% -2.60 0.011 -4.91 0.000 
[-5,5] 75 -2.47% -2.60 0.011 -4.82 0.000 
[-3,3] 75 -1.71% -2.26 0.026 -3.94 0.000 
[-1,1] 75 -0.76% -1.54 0.127 -1.73 0.083 
[0,1] 75 -0.71% -1.77 0.079 -2.04 0.041 
[0,3] 75 -0.76% -1.33 0.185 -2.31 0.021 
[0,5] 75 -1.00% -1.44 0.153 -2.66 0.008 
[0,7] 75 -1.19% -1.47 0.143 -2.96 0.003 
[-7,7] 75 -2.92% -2.60 0.011 -4.91 0.000 
[-7,7] 75 -2.92% -2.60 0.011 -4.91 0.000 
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Figure 5 Cumulative average abnormal return for competitors with event window of [-
20,10]  
The event date 0 is defined as the prospectus releasing date, Abnormal return is computed as the difference 
between the actual daily return and expected daily return over each indicated window. The expected return 
is estimated using market model by setting [-180,-60] trading days as the estimation window  
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Table 12 Regression of firm characteristics on cumulative abnormal return around prospectus releasing date for ownership related firms 
This table presents the regression explains for 3-day [-1,1], 2-day [0,1] and 4-day [0,3] cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). Independent variables include R&D 
expenditure growth rate (RD growth rate), number of total patents (log (Patent), the percentage of newly issued shares (Issued share percentage). Control variables 
include firm size (log (Assets)), debt to assets (Leverage) and Average sales growth rate over most recently three years (Sales Growth Rate). All models include 
industry fixed effect and standard errors are clustered at industry level. t-statistics associated with coefficients are reported in parentheses, ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 CAR[-1,1]  CAR[0,1]  CAR[0,3] 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
RD growth rate 0.139** 
  
0.130*** 
  
0.161* 
 
 
(2.30) 
  
(2.72) 
  
(1.76) 
 
Log(Patent) 
 
1.809* 
  
1.341 
  
1.696 
  
(1.83) 
  
(1.67) 
  
(1.13) 
Issued share 
percentage 
-0.611*** -0.521*** 
 
-0.582*** -0.503*** 
 
-0.657** -0.558** 
 
(-3.77) (-3.19) 
 
(-4.55) (-3.81) 
 
(-2.68) (-2.26) 
Log(asset) -4.278*** -3.997*** 
 
-4.678*** -4.319*** 
 
-6.427*** -5.988*** 
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(-2.93) (-2.71) 
 
(-4.05) (-3.62) 
 
(-2.90) (-2.68) 
Leverage 0.239*** 0.231*** 
 
0.193*** 0.188*** 
 
0.140 0.133 
 
(3.85) (3.64) 
 
(3.95) (3.66) 
 
(1.49) (1.38) 
Average sales growth 
rate 
0.003 0.038 
 
0.005 0.038* 
 
-0.039 0.001 
 
(0.10) (1.36) 
 
(0.22) (1.69) 
 
(-0.83) (0.02) 
Constant 57.665*** 45.975** 
 
63.484*** 52.875*** 
 
87.050*** 73.825** 
 
(3.00) (2.41) 
 
(4.18) (3.42) 
 
(2.98) (2.55) 
Industry Fixed Effects   Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
 
Observations 55 55 
 
55 55 
 
55 55 
R-squared 0.386 0.363 
 
0.468 0.420 
 
0.216 0.187 
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Table 13 Regression of firm characteristics on cumulative abnormal return around 
prospectus releasing date for competitors  
This table presents the regression explains for 15-day [-1,1], 11-day [-5,5] and 7-day [-3,3] 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). Independent variables include the percentage of newly issued 
shares (Issued share percentage), firm size (log (Assets)), debt to assets (Leverage) and Average sales 
growth rate over most recently three years (Sales Growth Rate). All models include industry fixed 
effect and standard errors are clustered at industry level. t-statistics associated with coefficients are 
reported in parentheses, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 CAR[-7,7] CAR[-5,5] CAR[-3,3] 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Issued share percentage -0.059** -0.057** -0.042** 
 
(-2.07) (-2.26) (-2.08) 
Log(Asset) -1.000 -0.821 0.886 
 
(-0.72) (-0.68) (0.90) 
Leverage 0.015 0.018 -0.088* 
 
(0.23) (0.30) (-1.82) 
Average sales growth rate 0.031 0.005 0.021 
 
(1.18) (0.23) (1.13) 
Constant 8.097 7.476 -9.212 
 
(0.52) (0.55) (-0.85) 
Industry Fixed Effects   Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 77 77 77 
R-squared 0.085 0.072 0.107 
 
 
 
49 
 
Appendix Ⅰ Ownership-related public listed firms 
STAR 
codea 
STAR company name Shareholder name Shareholder stock code 
A19004.SH ùŵƘƊŧĜDŕ ÝƫNu ƲƱŕ  601311 
A19006.SH ùţb6ác6ńŋŕ ÝƫNu œÒŕ  603006 
A19006.SH ùţb6ác6ńŋŕ ÝƫNu ƈÅŕ  002073 
A19006.SH ùţb6ác6ńŋŕ ÝƫNu ŷŲŦ 2437 
A19006.SH ùţb6ác6ńŋŕ ÝƫNu 9ƶŕ  603733 
A19006.SH ùţb6ác6ńŋŕ ÝƫNu a_o 600415 
A19006.SH ùţb6ác6ńŋŕ ÝƫNu ƈÅŕ  2073 
A19010.SH `đÊ..ħļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ùţƧ. 600220 
A19010.SH `đÊ..ħļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ţ¤ê A 000570 
A19010.SH `đÊ..ħļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ĉMĉŦ 000566 
A19012.SH ŔƉgAŕ ÝƫNu a_o 600415 
A19012.SH ŔƉgAŕ ÝƫNu {tĜr 300332 
A19016.SH ĕsĲ;“ŉ¿àŕ ÝƫNu Ɗŕ  600331 
A19016.SH ĕsĲ;“ŉ¿àŕ ÝƫNu Ɗŕ  600331 
A19016.SH ĕsĲ;“ŉ¿àŕ ÝƫNu d½Č 601107 
A19016.SH ĕsĲ;“ŉ¿àŕ ÝƫNu ¨ĐŦ 600557 
A19017.SH ĉānļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu {ŕ  600620 
A19018.SH ċm#ƮÅŕŕ ÝƫNu nƣiſ 600755 
A19018.SH ċm#ƮÅŕŕ ÝƫNu nƣEƊ 000701 
A19018.SH ċm#ƮÅŕŕ ÝƫNu nƣEƊ 701 
A19019.SH ">²ļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ƏƸ0œ 2491 
A19019.SH ">²ļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 
ŲźŸ 603017 
A19019.SH ">²ļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ĎÌŎŊ 002174 
A19020.SH Ú×gAĉŕ ÝƫNu ;ŌÆ 000810 
A19020.SH Ú×gAĉŕ ÝƫNu 
mƴƐ 600020 
A19020.SH Ú×gAĉŕ ÝƫNu āƊŕ  000652 
A19020.SH Ú×gAĉŕ ÝƫNu TCLƬf 000100 
A19020.SH Ú×gAĉŕ ÝƫNu Êď
 600208 
A19022.SH nƣěĤĚ¡ľŕ ÝƫNu Əa& 600867 
A19030.SH ^ŞŢė=Ƒţ ŕ ÝƫNu ù(ħ 300666 
A19031.SH ĀĬÊŗĐļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ƞŕ  000981 
A19032.SH őļ¿òøŕ ÝƫNu îæŕ  2634 
A19032.SH őļ¿òøŕ ÝƫNu &Ë; 600278 
A19034.SH ùţ{}ļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu hƦ# 000793  
A19034.SH ùţ{}ļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu zčŕ  002077 
A19034.SH ùţ{}ļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu Êƒ 300037 
A19034.SH ùţ{}ļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu Ăýŕ  002304 
A19035.SH òøļ?ĤĚŕ ÝƫNu ūŪĤĚ 603739 
A19036.SH ¦&<H4Ûŗųwŕ ÝƫNu ÝĵÊã 600206 
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A19036.SH ¦&<H4Ûŗųwŕ ÝƫNu TCLƬf 000100 
A19036.SH ¦&<H4Ûŗųwŕ ÝƫNu ”Ï: 300750 
A19038.SH ¦&bHļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu |Eŕ  2781 
A19039.SH ŵƔƄãÈļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ŵƔãÈ 002149 
A19045.SH ļziİƗ¿àŕ ÝƫNu ĹŜE» 000555 
A19045.SH ļziİƗ¿àŕ ÝƫNu ćù&Ë 600120 
A19045.SH ļziİƗ¿àŕ ÝƫNu ƞƇŕ  002126 
A19045.SH ļziİƗ¿àŕ ÝƫNu .Ƌļ¿ 002281 
A19046.SH ŭƈļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ƏƸ0œ 2491 
A19046.SH ŭƈļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ŏĮÇa 2699 
A19046.SH ŭƈļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ¸ŏ# 2712 
A19046.SH ŭƈļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu hÑa¡ 002274 
A19050.SH 
“gAźwĉŕ ÝƫNu 
mƴƐ 600020 
A19052.SH Ēƃļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu hŵŕ   000936 
A19052.SH Ēƃļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 
mƴƐ 600020 
A19054.SH Ļ©Ļ.ŕ ÝƫNu nƣiſ 600755 
A19065.SH ƭĉĤĚdĪŕ ÝƫNu ĉ©¡ 600170 
A19065.SH ƭĉĤĚdĪŕ ÝƫNu 
œƖļ 000157 
A19065.SH ƭĉĤĚdĪŕ ÝƫNu ĉ)č 600848 
A19065.SH ƭĉĤĚdĪŕ ÝƫNu ƭĉ 600690 
A19110.SH bśƍ0œƈŕ ÝƫNu .2" 2467 
a The STAR code is temporary assigned by Wind database 
Source: Wind database 
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Appendix Ⅱ Public listed competitor firms 
STAR codea STAR name Competitor name Competitor stock code 
A16088.SH bP”ƈŕ ÝƫNu b&ËƏļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300379 
A16232.SH ţ ¡gc8·ƈŕ ÝƫNu k°ļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 2649 
A16232.SH ţ ¡gc8·ƈŕ ÝƫNu ùţĊ^ƈŕ ÝƫNu 300339 
A17172.SH ċm¢æØě.ħŕ ÝƫNu zÌē.ļ¿3Ƭfŕ ÝƫNu 002008 
A17172.SH ċm¢æØě.ħŕ ÝƫNu h¡ļ¿3ŕ ÝƫNu 000988 
A17172.SH ċm¢æØě.ħŕ ÝƫNu òøƟļ.Ňē.¿àŕ ÝƫNu 300747 
A17172.SH ċm¢æØě.ħŕ ÝƫNu òøŃąħƬfŕ ÝƫNu 300567 
A17197.SH ċm¢;ƙē.ŕ ÝƫNu òøƟļ.Ňē.¿àŕ ÝƫNu 300747 
A17241.SH ĉŏƎŵĤĚdŦŕ ÝƫNu ¦ kĆdŦĤĚ¿àŕ ÝƫNu 300404 
A17241.SH ĉŏƎŵĤĚdŦŕ ÝƫNu bÖűÊŦĵĿ
¶ŕ ÝƫNu 603127 
A17241.SH ĉŏƎŵĤĚdŦŕ ÝƫNu å āìdŦļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300347 
A17241.SH ĉŏƎŵĤĚdŦŕ ÝƫNu ¨ƹa½(b)ÊŦ¿àŕ ÝƫNu 300759 
A17241.SH ĉŏƎŵĤĚdŦŕ ÝƫNu ÍƠŦÒ¨”ÊŦªTŕ ÝƫNu 603259 
A17372.SH ùţœġÊãÈŕ ÝƫNu ćùhưħpãÝƫNu 002409 
A19001.SH òøļ?ĤĚŕ ÝƫNu ØŧéĤĚ¡ľŕ ÝƫNu 603566 
A19001.SH òøļ?ĤĚŕ ÝƫNu {ăġØĤĚ¿àŕ ÝƫNu 300119 
A19001.SH òøļ?ĤĚŕ ÝƫNu 
ęŕ ÝƫNu 600195 
A19001.SH òøļ?ĤĚŕ ÝƫNu ĉĉ<ĤĚ¿àŕ ÝƫNu 603718 
A19001.SH òøļ?ĤĚŕ ÝƫNu ƘĤĚ¿àŕ ÝƫNu 600201 
A19004.SH ĀĬÊŗĐļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ďMââŗĐļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 835930 
A19004.SH ĀĬÊŗĐļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu b®fãÈļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300073 
A19004.SH ĀĬÊŗĐļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu nƣƛŕ ÝƫNu 600549 
A19005.SH ¦&<H4Ûŗųwŕ ÝƫNu zÌē.ļ¿3Ƭf ŕ ÝƫNu 002008 
A19005.SH ¦&<H4Ûŗųwŕ ÝƫNu ċmƂvļ¿ŕ Ýƫ Nu 300457 
A19005.SH ¦&<H4Ûŗųwŕ ÝƫNu ĉLäáħŚBa¡ľŕ ÝƫNu 603960 
A19005.SH ¦&<H4Ûŗųwŕ ÝƫNu Ļ©Ô/ħŕ Ýƫ Nu 300648 
A19005.SH ¦&<H4Ûŗųwŕ ÝƫNu ÍƠJÛŗųwŕ  ÝƫNu 300450 
A19005.SH ¦&<H4Ûŗųwŕ ÝƫNu ¦&ÂÉƊļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300637 
A19005.SH ¦&<H4Ûŗųwŕ ÝƫNu Êçác6ŚBaŕ ÝƫNu 300024 
A19006.SH ùţb6ác6ńŋŕ ÝƫNu ĉ{÷Ûŗųwŕ ÝƫNu 603895 
A19006.SH ùţb6ác6ńŋŕ ÝƫNu ĉLäáħŚBa¡ľŕ ÝƫNu 603960 
A19007.SH ùţ{}ļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ƭÐƙÊŗĐļ¿ÝƫNu 300409 
A19008.SH ĕsĲ;“ŉ¿àŕ ÝƫNu ćùzŁļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 002214 
A19014.SH ţ h4Đ;ļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu òøŃąħƬfŕ ÝƫNu 300567 
A19014.SH ţ h4Đ;ļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu å Ƣļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300604 
A19015.SH ċm“ŢĤĚļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ùţ¹ġdŦŕ ÝƫNu 600276 
A19015.SH ċm“ŢĤĚļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ċmEŁāŦŕ ÝƫNu 002294 
A19015.SH ċm“ŢĤĚļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ŽƊŦŕ ÝƫNu 300558 
A19015.SH ċm“ŢĤĚļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu b¨ƉŦŕ ÝƫNu 603590 
A19015.SH ċm“ŢĤĚļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ĉxĤĚdŦļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 833330 
A19015.SH ċm“ŢĤĚļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ½ƕ¨«ŦƬfŕ ÝƫNu 002773 
A19016.SH nƣěĤĚ¡ľŕ ÝƫNu µļĤĚ¡ľ(Ƭf)ŕ ÝƫNu 300009 
A19017.SH ļziİƗ¿àŕ ÝƫNu ìƈŕ ÝƫNu 603232 
A19017.SH ļziİƗ¿àŕ ÝƫNu ư{ŻEļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300386 
A19017.SH ļziİƗ¿àŕ ÝƫNu 
E»ŕ ÝƫNu 300659 
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A19017.SH ļziİƗ¿àŕ ÝƫNu ćù- ƗE»¿àŕ ÝƫNu 837638 
A19017.SH ļziİƗ¿àŕ ÝƫNu ½ƕluƏE»3ŕ ÝƫNu 002268 
A19019.SH .e ňŀƥ¿à§ĥŕ ÝƫNu ğĉðóěÅ=¡ľŕ ÝƫNu 300053 
A19020.SH ċm.ļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ƭĉEħcŕ ÝƫNu 600060 
A19029.SH Ļ©Ļ.ŕ ÝƫNu 
œv.ħļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300691 
A19030.SH å ƵþĚœŎ¿àŕ ÝƫNu ùţÊĝ:ĚĄŕ ÝƫNu 300013 
A19030.SH å ƵþĚœŎ¿àŕ ÝƫNu 4ôÛƏ(Ƭf)ŕ ÝƫNu 002355 
A19030.SH å ƵþĚœŎ¿àŕ ÝƫNu ¼ő“ħŕ ÝƫNu 832245 
A19030.SH å ƵþĚœŎ¿àŕ ÝƫNu bdŌjÊļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 002405 
A19040.SH ċm¢ŽÉƊdĪŕ ÝƫNu ğĉ^CdĪźwŕ ÝƫNu 300273 
A19040.SH ċm¢ŽÉƊdĪŕ ÝƫNu ċmªŁĤĚdĪļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300633 
A19040.SH ċm¢ŽÉƊdĪŕ ÝƫNu b&dĪļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 600055 
A19040.SH ċm¢ŽÉƊdĪŕ ÝƫNu ċmƌġĤĚdĪħŕ ÝƫNu 300760 
A19040.SH ċm¢ŽÉƊdĪŕ ÝƫNu ƙƴĭdĪźwŕ ÝƫNu 835758 
A19041.SH bßģĽBļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu h¾œ!Æ¿àŕ ÝƫNu 603825 
A19041.SH bßģĽBļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu bŪş.ëÆÃļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300058 
A19041.SH bßģĽBļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ¦&CIC/ļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300242 
A19042.SH 
“gAźwĉŕ ÝƫNu bËh;ļ¿Ƭfŕ ÝƫNu 002371 
A19043.SH ƁżdĪļ¿àŕ ÝƫNu ,Ø(b)dĪcíŕ ÝƫNu 300003 
A19044.SH Ƭ“ħļ¿ĉŕ ÝƫNu ĉÊƧgAãÈŕ ÝƫNu 300236 
A19045.SH `đÊ..ħļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ćùzŁļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 002214 
A19045.SH `đÊ..ħļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ďbĂņyńŋŕ ÝƫNu 300516 
A19045.SH `đÊ..ħļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu òøƴ”ņyŕ ÝƫNu 002414 
A19046.SH å ®ŭļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu bÆĴŶŹļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300079 
A19046.SH å ®ŭļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ċm¢C;ŶŹ¿àŕ ÝƫNu 300264 
A19046.SH å ®ŭļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu bÄ½ňļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300182 
A19046.SH å ®ŭļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu z¹ÊňHļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 600288 
A19048.SH 2Åļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ćù!vļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 000925 
A19052.SH k!Ń¡ļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ÍƠJÛŗųwŕ ÝƫNu 300450 
A19052.SH k!Ń¡ļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ċm¢Ƃvļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300457 
A19052.SH k!Ń¡ļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ûƧÊçác6ŚBaŕ ÝƫNu 300024 
A19052.SH k!Ń¡ļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ţ ƁŘŃħŕ ÝƫNu 603283 
A19056.SH ĉÚ(ÒĐgAŕ ÝƫNu å uP“ħŕ ÝƫNu 600460 
A19058.SH ĦœĤĚdŦĉŕ ÝƫNu SũrĤĚŕ ÝƫNu 600201 
A19058.SH ĦœĤĚdŦĉŕ ÝƫNu 
ęŕ ÝƫNu 600195 
A19058.SH ĦœĤĚdŦĉŕ ÝƫNu ĉĉ<ĤĚ¿àŕ ÝƫNu 603718 
A19058.SH ĦœĤĚdŦĉŕ ÝƫNu Êĩ{¨ĨęĤĚ¿àŕ ÝƫNu 002100 
A19059.SH ¦&ŅÚE»*¿àŕ ÝƫNu bÓh¯E»¿àŕ ÝƫNu 300212 
A19059.SH ¦&ŅÚE»*¿àŕ ÝƫNu bZÝưƳļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300302 
A19061.SH ¹bÊbļ¿ŕ Nu bĹ ōįE»Mļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300369 
A19061.SH ¹bÊbļ¿ŕ Nu ùţ÷Ƹŕ ÝƫNu 600105 
A19061.SH ¹bÊbļ¿ŕ Nu ŰŎŊ¿àŕ ÝƫNu 300311 
A19061.SH ¹bÊbļ¿ŕ Nu b{ůEļ¿ÝƫNu 002212 
A19064.SH bĖÙĤĚ¿àŕ ÝƫNu ¦ ĤĚ¿àŕ ÝƫNu 300482 
A19064.SH bĖÙĤĚ¿àŕ ÝƫNu Ɠ jĤĚ¡ľŕ ÝƫNu 603658 
A19064.SH bĖÙĤĚ¿àŕ ÝƫNu òøÒ”ĤĚļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 002932 
A19064.SH bĖÙĤĚ¿àŕ ÝƫNu pŮĤĚļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 603387 
A19064.SH bĖÙĤĚ¿àŕ ÝƫNu ċmƌġĤĚdĪħŕ ÝƫNu 300760 
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A19064.SH bĖÙĤĚ¿àŕ ÝƫNu b<”ÜĤaŕ ÝƫNu 300289 
A19065.SH ţ ĔÛŗļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ĉLäáħŚBa¡ľŕ ÝƫNu 603960 
A19066.SH ŖE»¿àŕ ÝƫNu MÊœħŕ ÝƫNu 002546 
A19066.SH ŖE»¿àŕ ÝƫNu ċmoŹƊļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300514 
A19066.SH ŖE»¿àŕ ÝƫNu . ļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300356 
A19067.SH bkƏļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ċEÞļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300454 
A19068.SH ŵƝ@ěsã¿àŕ ÝƫNu J)"Ōļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 830978 
A19074.SH ŶœB@E»¿àŕ ÝƫNu ţ ļƊļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 603660 
A19074.SH ŶœB@E»¿àŕ ÝƫNu .2"ŎŊƏEŕ ÝƫNu 002467 
A19074.SH ŶœB@E»¿àŕ ÝƫNu h¥E»¿àŕ ÝƫNu 300074 
A19074.SH ŶœB@E»¿àŕ ÝƫNu 
4ƏŹŕ ÝƫNu 000063 
A19075.SH kġĤĚdŦţ ŕ ÝƫNu ùţ¹ġdŦŕ ÝƫNu 600276 
A19075.SH kġĤĚdŦţ ŕ ÝƫNu ćùĉñŦŕ ÝƫNu 600267 
A19075.SH kġĤĚdŦţ ŕ ÝƫNu ćù~ŐŦŕ ÝƫNu 603229 
A19078.SH å ¹E»¿àŕ ÝƫNu bbEĐƈŕ ÝƫNu 300352 
A19078.SH å ¹E»¿àŕ ÝƫNu ŰŎŊ¿àŕ ÝƫNu 300311 
A19078.SH å ¹E»¿àŕ ÝƫNu yÒÔƉE»¿àƬfŕ ÝƫNu 002439 
A19078.SH å ¹E»¿àŕ ÝƫNu ŪİE»M¿àŕ ÝƫNu 300297 
A19078.SH å ¹E»¿àŕ ÝƫNu ċEÞļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300454 
A19078.SH å ¹E»¿àŕ ÝƫNu bĹ ōįE»Mļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300369 
A19079.SH ĳŎļƏE¿àŕ ÝƫNu yÒÔƉE»¿àƬfŕ ÝƫNu 002439 
A19079.SH ĳŎļƏE¿àŕ ÝƫNu bĹ ōįE»Mļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300369 
A19079.SH ĳŎļƏE¿àŕ ÝƫNu b{ůEļ¿ÝƫNu 002212 
A19079.SH ĳŎļƏE¿àŕ ÝƫNu ċEÞļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300454 
A19079.SH ĳŎļƏE¿àŕ ÝƫNu å ƎØļ¿ÝƫNu 300768 
A19081.SH ĉèïħļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ĉŌħļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300508 
A19082.SH ùţiÓE»ļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu Mƈŕ ÝƫNu 603636 
A19082.SH ùţiÓE»ļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ƊE»ŕ ÝƫNu 300168 
A19082.SH ùţiÓE»ļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu bƞEƢƍļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300231 
A19082.SH ùţiÓE»ļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu bhƈŕ ÝƫNu 300271 
A19083.SH ¬č¦zěãŕ ÝƫNu ƏŴƖ¡ŕ ÝƫNu 300185 
A19083.SH ¬č¦zěãŕ ÝƫNu bƚĵƴŉļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300034 
A19089.SH bú”ƘWĳ¡Rŕ ÝƫNu ƢüCÊãÈļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu  300700 
A19089.SH bú”ƘWĳ¡Rŕ ÝƫNu ċm¢
{Ƅķ¡Rŕ ÝƫNu  430740 
A19089.SH bú”ƘWĳ¡Rŕ ÝƫNu M"ƄÊãÈŕ ÝƫNu  300554 
A19089.SH bú”ƘWĳ¡Rŕ ÝƫNu ŒLƄķãÈŕ ÝƫNu  831378 
A19090.SH ¦&hěõAŕ ÝƫNu ùţMz.ħãÈŕ ÝƫNu 300346 
A19091.SH b{CƴÊãÈŕ ÝƫNu kċ¡Rŕ ÝƫNu 2282 
A19092.SH bŝ{jE»¿àŕ ÝƫNu v!¸v 2382 
A19103.SH ¦&bHļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ż”Àƀŕ ÝƫNu  600110 
A19103.SH ¦&bHļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ¦&Ƅhļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu  2288 
A19104.SH b%8dĪļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu JFļ¿Nu 1302 
A19104.SH b%8dĪļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ĕsñĉĤĚļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300653 
A19104.SH b%8dĪļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu TÐĤĚļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300238 
A19105.SH ùŵƘƊŧĜDŕ ÝƫNu bĸöĐļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300070 
A19105.SH ùŵƘƊŧĜDŕ ÝƫNu k{ĜrƬfŕ ÝƫNu 603603 
A19105.SH ùŵƘƊŧĜDŕ ÝƫNu bĸöĐļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300070 
A19105.SH ùŵƘƊŧĜDŕ ÝƫNu µiĺĜDšŗļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300388 
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A19105.SH ùŵƘƊŧĜDŕ ÝƫNu Ļ©ĉĜDƬfŕ ÝƫNu 603817 
A19106.SH 
iƜƆƏEEtŕ ÝƫNu ćù!vļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 925 
A19107.SH ċmØƣļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu µŝ{ĤĚļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 833607 
A19107.SH ċmØƣļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ùţ~Ǝ¨dļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 835620 
A19107.SH ċmØƣļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ĉĊƊdĪļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 603108 
A19107.SH ċmØƣļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu Ɠ jĤĚ¡ľŕ ÝƫNu 603658 
A19107.SH ċmØƣļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ċmƌġĤĚdĪħŕ ÝƫNu 300760 
A19109.SH bÕőƏŎŊ¿àŕ ÝƫNu b&kļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu  300353 
A19109.SH bÕőƏŎŊ¿àŕ ÝƫNu Ļ©ÔŎƟÄƏŹŕ ÝƫNu  2396 
A19109.SH bÕőƏŎŊ¿àŕ ÝƫNu øļ¿Ƭfŕ ÝƫNu 300007 
A19109.SH bÕőƏŎŊ¿àŕ ÝƫNu ġÉ¨Ɗļ¿Tŕ ÝƫNu 603803 
A19110.SH {ăÎÊãÈŕ ÝƫNu ďbhĊļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 835595 
A19110.SH {ăÎÊãÈŕ ÝƫNu ¤ ­@ħÊãÈŕ ÝƫNu 300429 
A19110.SH {ăÎÊãÈŕ ÝƫNu ćù¾£ÊãÈŕ ÝƫNu 300637 
A19111.SH M”ÉĜDļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu bƴŗÏ:Ĝr¿àŕ ÝƫNu 603588 
A19111.SH M”ÉĜDļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ¦ŵkļĜDļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300422 
A19113.SH ĀƢƧļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ùţŴ4Ŭřļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300305 
A19113.SH ĀƢƧļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ùţpÔ±qÊãÈŕ ÝƫNu 2585 
A19113.SH ĀƢƧļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ¨²ÊxvãÈƬfŕ ÝƫNu 2450 
A19113.SH ĀƢƧļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ŝ{±ŭÍ6áŕ ÝƫNu 2389 
A19114.SH ùţĈðkĤĚdŦŕ ÝƫNu ĉļÊĤĚ¿àŕ ÝƫNu 430175 
A19115.SH ơ Ĺ¡gAŕ ÝƫNu Ļ©Ʃĳ;ÊãÈŕ ÝƫNu 300706 
A19115.SH ơ Ĺ¡gAŕ ÝƫNu ¤ ­@ħÊãÈŕ ÝƫNu 300429 
A19115.SH ơ Ĺ¡gAŕ ÝƫNu Āù(ħãÈŕ ÝƫNu 300666 
A19115.SH ơ Ĺ¡gAŕ ÝƫNu ďbŨ<hĳŤĞĢŕ ÝƫNu 300395 
A19115.SH ơ Ĺ¡gAŕ ÝƫNu ùƨùa“ħãÈŕ ÝƫNu 603078 
A19116.SH bśƍ0œƈŕ ÝƫNu ĉÿ“ŎŊļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 603039 
A19117.SH "ƊřĜr¿àŕ ÝƫNu {ăř{řļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300334 
A19117.SH "ƊřĜr¿àŕ ÝƫNu {ă;ĜDƬfŕ ÝƫNu 600874 
A19117.SH "ƊřĜr¿àŕ ÝƫNu Ʒƹùi
öAŕ ÝƫNu 600187 
A19117.SH "ƊřĜr¿àŕ ÝƫNu bĸöĐļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300070 
A19120.SH ùţĶĤĚļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu nƣŠ”ĤĚdŦļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300685 
A19120.SH ùţĶĤĚļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ¦&9ØĤĚļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300639 
A19120.SH ùţĶĤĚļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 
zƊºpeŕ ÝƫNu 2030 
A19120.SH ùţĶĤĚļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu ĉùĤĚļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 834839 
A19121.SH kÁŎŊŕ ÝƫNu ¦&ı¦]ŕ ÝƫNu  2400 
A19121.SH kÁŎŊŕ ÝƫNu ļƊƬfŕ ÝƫNu  600986 
A19121.SH kÁŎŊŕ ÝƫNu 1iƪ_ĘłĠ(b)ŕ ÝƫNu  300612 
A19121.SH kÁŎŊŕ ÝƫNu bŪş.ë_ĘłĠƯƤŕ ÝƫNu  300058 
A19121.SH kÁŎŊŕ ÝƫNu <ðƬfŕ ÝƫNu  2123 
A19122.SH ž ī/ļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu Ŏļ¿ŕ ÝƫNu 300017 
A19123.SH ƹiƅÊŗĐŕ ÝƫNu ť zlĤĚ¡ľŕ ÝƫNu 833662 
a The ST STAR IB code is temporary assigned by Wind database 
Source: The prospectus released by STAR firms 
 
